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INTRODUCTION 
Christina Voight was pregnant with her son Lance while being prosecuted 
for arson.1 Though she bitterly contested the charges, she was convicted and 
sentenced to prison for four to eight years.2 Christina gave birth to Lance short-
ly after beginning to serve her sentence.3 Authorities immediately took him 
away from her and sent him to a foster home.4 Shortly thereafter, the state  filed 
a petition to terminate Christina’s parental rights.5 
It was no easy task to fight the state from prison. After some legal maneu-
vering, however, the state withdrew their petition and moved Lance into a 
home dedicated to helping incarcerated women maintain a relationship with 
their children.6 During the remaining three years of Christina’s sentence, Lance 
visited her frequently.7 She left prison and began working for the Open Society 
Institute, an organization dedicated to criminal justice reform.8 She has since 
                                                        
1  David Crary, Prison Moms Fight Termination of Parental Rights, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2003, at A16. 
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
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become a prominent advocate for social justice, focusing on incarcerated wom-
en and reproductive rights.9 
Christina was fortunate in that she had an attorney.10 Many of her fellow 
inmates were not so fortunate.11 Recognizing the plight of other incarcerated 
women, Christina ran workshops in the prison to educate them on the legal pro-
cess and the importance of staying in contact with their children.12 For many of 
these women, Christina’s help was the closest they came to receiving legal ad-
vice.13 
The U.S. Constitution does not recognize a right to counsel in termination 
of parental rights (TPR) proceedings. While the Constitution explicitly safe-
guards the right to counsel in criminal proceedings,14 as well as protection of 
individual due process rights,15 it makes no mention of a right to counsel in 
TPR proceedings or any other form of civil proceeding.16 In the landmark Las-
siter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County decision, the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined that this omission indicated “the Constitution [does 
not require] the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceed-
ing.”17 The Supreme Court of Nevada emphatically agreed, when it declared, 
“[N]o absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada.”18 
These holdings inevitably lead to defendants being denied counsel in proceed-
ings seeking to terminate their parental rights—some of the most fundamental 
rights that exist. Only four other states deny indigent defendants the right to an 
attorney when the awesome power of the government moves to eliminate their 
                                                        
9  Michelle Chen, Parents in Prison, Children in Foster Care, GOTHAM GAZETTE (July 20, 
2009), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/state/266-parents-in-prison-children-in-fos 
ter-care. 
10  Crary, supra note 1. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Though many TPR cases feature defendants that are not nearly as sympathetic as Christi-
na Voight, all defendants should enjoy the same rights, regardless of the facts of their partic-
ular case. In fact, it is the more unsympathetic defendants that may be in more need of repre-
sentation, as proving their case is likely to be more difficult. 
14  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
15  See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
16  See generally U.S. CONST. (containing no explicit language regarding a right to counsel in 
civil proceedings). 
17  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981). 
18  In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 225 (Nev. 2005). 
16 NEV. L.J. 313, FOLEY - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  9:28 PM 
316 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:313  
parental rights.19 Nevada must join the forty-five other states20 and declare an 
absolute right to counsel in TPR proceedings, both at trial and on appeal. 
Since the Lassiter decision, legal scholars across the country have argued 
for the adoption of “Civil Gideon.”21 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court rec-
ognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings is a 
fundamental right, and it therefore applies to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The support for a broader right to 
counsel can be traced back as far as the Magna Carta.23 The modern movement, 
though, has certainly gained momentum in the aftermath of the Gideon and 
Lassiter decisions.24 
The term “Civil Gideon” is misleading, however, as it implies a push to-
wards an absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings similar to the fundamen-
tal Sixth Amendment right to counsel as recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright.25 
Most scholars generally do not advocate the creation of such a broad right.26 
Instead, the proponents of Civil Gideon argue for the right to counsel in civil 
proceedings only where fundamental interests or basic human needs are at 
stake.27  
The right to be the parent to one’s child is so fundamental that defendants 
threatened with the termination of that right should have a categorical right to 
counsel in such proceedings. While many of these arguments could apply to 
every state and to the federal government, this Note will focus specifically on 
the status of Nevada law and the corresponding need for change. 
Part I begins with a general discussion of the rights of the indigent defend-
ant in TPR proceedings, including the distinctions between criminal and civil 
rights to counsel, a history of the relevant federal cases, and an examination of 
the approaches of the fifty states and of foreign nations. Part II introduces the 
history of the legislative and judicial law regarding Civil Gideon in Nevada. 
Part III identifies the failures of the case-by-case approach created in Lassiter. 
This section will include a general analysis of the implications of Lassiter and a 
                                                        
19  See John Pollock, The Case Against Case-by-Case: Courts Identifying Categorical Rights 
to Counsel in Basic Human Needs Civil Cases, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 781 (2013) (noting 
that forty-four states provided a categorical right to counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 
319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the forty-fifth state to provide this right). 
20  See Pollock, supra note 19; see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d at 355. 
21  See, e.g., Sarah Dina Moore Alba, Note, Searching for the “Civil Gideon”: Procedural 
Due Process and the Juvenile Right to Counsel in Termination Proceedings, 13 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1079, 1081 (2011) (discussing the “robust support for a Civil Gideon”). 
22  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963). 
23  See Ward B. Coe III & Debra Gardner, A Right to Counsel in Critical Civil Cases and the 
Role of the Private Bar, 47 MD. B.J., July–Aug. 2014, at 12, 14. 
24  See id. 
25  John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, It’s Not Triage If the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 40, 40 n.1 (2012). 
26  Coe & Gardner, supra note 23, at 15. 
27  Id. 
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specific examination of the ramifications of Nevada’s current approach. Final-
ly, part IV proposes creating a categorical right to counsel in TPR proceedings. 
I. THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT IN TERMINATION OF  
PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES, GENERALLY 
The Supreme Court has recognized a right to counsel on a case-by-case ba-
sis in civil cases, including in TPR proceedings.28 The overwhelming majority 
of the states have since recognized the importance of counsel in these proceed-
ings and have created their own right through either legislative or judicial ac-
tion.29 To understand this disparity between state and federal law, it is im-
portant to recognize the different constitutional rights afforded to the criminal 
and civil defendants. 
A. The Divergent Rights of the Indigent Defendant 
in Criminal and Civil Proceedings 
There can be no doubt that our justice system treats the indigent civil de-
fendant differently than the indigent criminal defendant. Criminal defendants 
are guaranteed the right to counsel;30 civil defendants are not.31 The U.S. Con-
stitution is the source of this disparity. 
1. The Sixth Amendment: Indigent Defendants in Criminal Proceedings 
While the Constitution provides no explicit right to counsel in civil pro-
ceedings,32 the Bill of Rights clearly enumerates a right to counsel in criminal 
proceedings. The Sixth Amendment’s final clause states, 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence.33 
In Gideon, the Supreme Court held the right to counsel in criminal pro-
ceedings is a fundamental right and incorporated it to the states through the 
                                                        
28  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981). 
29  See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to 
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the 
forty-fifth state to provide this right). 
30  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
31  See generally U.S. CONST. (containing no explicit language regarding a right to counsel in 
civil proceedings). 
32  Id. 
33  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
16 NEV. L.J. 313, FOLEY - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  9:28 PM 
318 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:313  
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.34 In support of this holding, the 
Court made several observations: (1) governments allocate significant funds 
toward the prosecution of criminal defendants;35 (2) that the government and 
the affluent do not hesitate to enlist the aid of an attorney shows the necessity 
of counsel;36 (3) even the most intelligent layman is likely to have no skill in 
the law;37 and (4) an unrepresented innocent person may still be found guilty if 
he does not know how to prove that he is innocent.38 
2.  No Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings 
Conversely, the Court has recognized no such corresponding right in civil 
proceedings.39 Although most civil cases deal with issues that do not threaten a 
party’s fundamental interests, some claims do rise to this level. For example, 
courts jail thousands of defendants daily in civil contempt for failing to pay 
child support.40 In fact, although Nevada has a criminal statute for nonpayment 
of child support,41 family court judges may still hold a nonpaying defendant in 
civil contempt.42 Both proceedings carry the possible penalty of incarceration.43 
Despite the possible loss of liberty in the latter situation, the defendant has no 
right to an attorney.44 This reality does not comport with the principles the Su-
preme Court addressed in Gideon.45 
Similarly, defendants in TPR proceedings face the loss of an interest possi-
bly even more compelling than their own physical liberty—the right to be a 
parent to their own children. The Supreme Court noted: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and 
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her children “come[s] to this Court with 
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive 
merely from shifting economic arrangements.”46 
                                                        
34  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings is a “fundamental right”). 
35  Id. at 344. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 345 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
38  Id. (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 69). 
39  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981). 
40  Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Si-
lent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 95 (2008). 
41  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.020 (2013). 
42  See Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 102 P.3d 41, 43 (Nev. 
2004). 
43  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.020; Rodriguez, 102 P.3d at 43. 
44  See Rodriguez, 102 P.3d at 43. 
45  See supra text accompanying notes 34–38. 
46  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (alteration in original) (quoting Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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Because the Constitution is silent on the right to counsel in civil proceed-
ings, such a right can only be derived from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”47 This constitutional 
command applies only to the federal government.48 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment extends its application to state governments, providing that “nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”49 It is from these due process guarantees that a right to counsel in termi-
nation of parental rights proceedings originates.50 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding Right to Counsel in Civil 
Proceedings 
The U.S. Supreme Court has delivered two key opinions relevant to the 
civil right to counsel. Mathews created the due process test and Lassiter applied 
that test to conclude that civil defendants are not constitutionally entitled to an 
attorney.51 
1. The Mathews v. Eldridge Test 
Any due process analysis must begin by applying the test the Supreme 
Court created in Mathews v. Eldridge.52 There, the Court considered a chal-
lenge to administrative procedures that resulted in the termination of the plain-
tiff’s Social Security disability payments.53 The Court found that the existing 
administrative procedures adequately protected the plaintiff’s due process in-
terests.54 In doing so, the Court created a three-pronged balancing test for due 
process claims, by which a court must consider  
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and prob-
able value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s 
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedures would entail.55 
                                                        
47  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
48  Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (holding “the fifth amendment must 
be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the 
states”). 
49  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (in-
corporating the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
50  See infra Part IV. 
51  See infra Part I.B. 
52  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
53  Id. at 319–20. 
54  Id. at 339–40. 
55  Id. at 321. 
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Unlike the absolute right to counsel provided to criminal defendants under 
the Sixth Amendment, this due process analysis must occur on a case-by-case 
basis. However, even the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for criminal de-
fendants was determined on a case-by-case basis until the Court expressly over-
ruled such analysis in Gideon.56 
2.  The Lassiter Setback 
The Court first applied the Eldridge factors to involuntary termination of 
parental rights proceedings in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of 
Durham County.57 There, after the petitioner, Abby Lassiter, was imprisoned 
pursuant to a second-degree murder conviction, the local Department of Social 
Services petitioned to terminate her parental rights.58 The trial court declined to 
delay the hearing so that Ms. Lassiter could seek counsel, and it neglected to 
consider her indigence.59 The court terminated Ms. Lassiter’s parent rights, cit-
ing her failure to contact her infant son for more than two years or to plan for 
his future.60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.61 
In a major setback to proponents of the Civil Gideon movement, the Court 
held that the Due Process Clause does not mandate the appointment of counsel 
in TPR proceedings.62 Instead, the Court declared that the trial court is to make 
such a determination on a case-by-case basis by applying the Eldridge factors.63 
The Court noted:  
Here, as in Scarpelli, “[i]t is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to for-
mulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining 
when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process 
requirements,” since here, as in that case, “[t]he facts and circumstances . . . are 
susceptible of almost infinite variation.”64 
The Court then applied the Mathews v. Eldridge factors to Ms. Lassiter’s 
circumstances and noted that (1) no allegations implicated criminal acts; (2) the 
hearing required no expert witnesses; (3) the area of law was not troublesome; 
and (4) most importantly, the presence of counsel would not have made a dif-
ference.65 Though the private interest at stake was high, the Court determined 
that the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest was low,66 and therefore, 
the failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for Ms. Lassiter did not deprive 
                                                        
56  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
57  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27–32 (1981). 
58  Id. at 20–21. 
59  Id. at 22. 
60  Id. at 23–24. 
61  Id. at 24. 
62  Id. at 32. 
63  See id. 
64  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)). 
65  Id. at 32–33. 
66  Id. at 33. 
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her of her due process rights.67 The implications of Lassiter are troubling. Las-
siter “stands for the proposition that a drunken driver’s night in the cooler is a 
greater deprivation of liberty than a parent’s permanent loss of rights in a 
child.”68 
C. An Overview of the States’ Approaches to Right to Counsel in TPR 
Proceedings 
The number of states providing an attorney, by law, in TPR proceedings 
has steadily increased—even in the wake of the Lassiter decision.69 This sug-
gests the states recognize the fundamental rights at risk in these proceedings. 
Whatever the reason, the progress in the states is encouraging.  
1. States’ Approaches Before Lassiter 
At the time of the Lassiter decision, thirty-three states and the District of 
Columbia had either a statute or binding precedent that provided for a categori-
cal right to counsel in termination proceedings.70 The Lassiter Court, in an ap-
parent acknowledgment of the dangers of its holding, noted this fact, stating 
that its “opinion today [denying a Constitutional right to counsel in TPR cases] 
in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public 
opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and 
wise.”71 
2.  States’ Approaches After Lassiter 
Any fears that the Lassiter decision would convince these thirty-three 
states to roll back their added protections were soon dispelled. Mississippi was 
the only state that retreated to a case-by-case approach after Lassiter.72 By 
1997, forty-four states offered a categorical right to counsel in TPR cases.73 
The other six states—Delaware, Hawaii, South Carolina, Tennessee, Wyoming, 
and Mississippi—all employed a case-by-case determination using the Eldridge 
factors.74  
                                                        
67  Id. 
68  Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent’s Right to Coun-
sel After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981). 
69  See infra Part I.C.1–2. 
70  Pollock, supra note 19. 
71  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34. 
72  See Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings: The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247, 262 (1997). However, 
this is misleading. Mississippi is counted among the thirty-three states with categorical ap-
proaches in the Lassiter decision only because petitioner’s brief claimed it to be true. Id. 
Mississippi repealed that statute, though, two years prior to the Lassiter decision. Id. 
73  See id. at 276–77. 
74  See id. 
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Currently, state law shows little change since 1997.75 In 2008, South Caro-
lina yielded to the Civil Gideon movement when it passed legislation declaring, 
“[p]arents, guardians, or other persons subject to a termination of parental 
rights action are entitled to legal counsel. Those persons unable to afford legal 
representation must be appointed counsel by the family court . . . .”76 In 2010, 
Tennessee followed suit when it enacted a statute that entitles parents to “repre-
sentation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding . . . involving . . . 
[t]ermination of parental rights.”77 Finally, in 2014, the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii declared that the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution “guaran-
teed the right to court-appointed counsel in termination proceedings.”78 Cur-
rently, forty-five states and the District of Columbia provide indigent 
defendants with a categorical right to counsel in termination of parental rights 
proceedings.79 
Unfortunately, two states that once provided a categorical right to counsel 
in TPR cases have since restricted the right.80 Minnesota converted to the case-
by-case approach when it modified its statute to require the appointment of 
counsel only when the court “feels that such an appointment is appropriate.”81 
Nevada is the only other state to retreat from its previously afforded protec-
tions.82 Delaware, Mississippi, and Wyoming have all maintained their case-by-
case approach.83 
Nevertheless, the right to counsel has continued to expand nationwide. Im-
portantly, states that already provide the right have expanded its application.84 
These gains have occurred both legislatively and judicially,85 and states have 
expanded both the legal issues86 and the procedural stages87 to which the right 
applies. This trend demonstrates that states continue to favor expanding the 
                                                        
75  See Young, supra note 72, at 276–77; see also Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76. 
76  S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2560(A) (2010) (emphasis added). 
77  TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-126(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2013). 
78  In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014). 
79  See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to 
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d at 355 (making Hawaii the forty-fifth state to 
provide this right). 
80  See Young, supra note 72, at 276–77; see also Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76. 
81  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(3)(b) (West 2012) (emphasis added). 
82  See Young, supra note 72, at 276–77; see also Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76; infra 
Part II. 
83  See Pollock, supra note 19, at 781 n.76. 
84  See Alba, supra note 21, at 1091. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. (showing the establishment of the right to counsel for “cases involving child custody, 
involuntary commitment and guardianship, orders of protection, and civil contempt”). 
87  See Patricia C. Kussmann, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in 
Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 92 A.L.R.5th Art. 379 (2001) 
(showing the establishment of the right to counsel in pretermination investigations, in review 
proceedings following dependency hearings, and in appellate proceedings). 
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right to counsel in civil proceedings—particularly those that involve “critical 
issues affecting basic human needs.”88 
Those states that still use the case-by-case approach deny indigent defend-
ants counsel for a wide variety of reasons.89 For example, some states deny a 
request for counsel if it is not timely made.90 Others may deny counsel when 
the defendant fails to appear.91 One court in Tennessee denied counsel to two 
indigent parents, because they “were active participants in the termination pro-
ceeding.”92 In doing so, the court distinguished the parents’ education from 
other, more “poorly educated” defendants.93 This was a peculiar approach, con-
sidering that the mother had only a GED and the father had only completed the 
eighth grade.94 
D. The Right Internationally 
In a nation that calls itself “the land of the free”95 and that regularly casti-
gates the human rights records of other countries,96 the United States is far from 
the model nation when it comes to the civil right to counsel. English common 
law granted the right to counsel for indigent defendants in civil cases as far 
back as the thirteenth century.97 Parliament codified the right in 1495.98 
Additionally, most other European countries have laws providing a civil 
right to counsel.99 France recognized the right in 1852, Italy in 1865, and Ger-
many in 1877, with the rest passing “Civil Gideon” laws in the late 1800s and 
                                                        
88  Alba, supra note 21, at 1091 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651 (West 2011)). 
89  See Kussmann, supra note 87. 
90  See, e.g., K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss. 
2000) (finding no right to counsel for an indigent defendant because “she never asked for a 
continuance or for additional time to seek substitute counsel”). 
91  See, e.g., In re Angela R., 260 Cal. Rptr. 612, 624 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding no require-
ment to appoint counsel where a defendant fails to appear because the statute only required 
such appointment “for an indigent parent who appears without counsel”). 
92  In re Fillinger, No. 02A01-9409-JV-00223, 1996 WL 271748, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 
23, 1996). 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  See The Star-Spangled Banner Lyrics, SMITHSONIAN, http://amhistory.si.edu/starspang 
ledbanner/the-lyrics.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2015). 
96  See Robin Wright, Dictators Upbraid U.S. for Racial Unrest in Ferguson, WALL ST. J.: 
WASH. WIRE (Aug. 19, 2014, 4:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/08/19/dicta 
tors-upbraid-u-s-for-racial-unrest-in-ferguson. 
97  AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A, at 6 (2006), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/l
s_sclaid_resolution_06a112a.authcheckdam.pdf. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. at 7. 
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early 1900s.100 Additionally, much of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia pro-
vide indigent civil defendants with the right to counsel.101 
Notably, most foreign jurisdictions that provide this right do so for all civil 
cases.102 This presumably would include cases that threaten no fundamental in-
terest or basic human need. Of the forty-five American states that currently 
guarantee the right to counsel in TPR proceedings, none has protections as 
broad as most of the aforementioned countries.103 
II. THE HISTORY OF CIVIL GIDEON IN NEVADA 
The history of Civil Gideon in Nevada is a confusing one. The Nevada Su-
preme Court has oscillated from finding no right to counsel in TPR cases, to 
holding that the right exists, to again finding no such right in Nevada—all in 
the absence of underlying substantive statutory changes by the Nevada Legisla-
ture.104 Ultimately, In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O. stands as binding law in 
Nevada, stripping the right to counsel from TPR defendants.105 
A.  Pre-Lassiter 
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized the serious implications of a termi-
nation of parental rights proceeding when it stated that the “termination of a 
parent’s rights to her child is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penal-
ty.”106 While Nevada acknowledges the fundamental interests at stake, it re-
mains one of only five states that do not guarantee indigent defendants a cate-
gorical right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings.107 In 
terms of due process rights, the Nevada Constitution mirrors the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Both declare that no individual may “be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”108 
Nevada’s legislature first addressed the issue in 1953, when it passed the 
awkwardly titled “AN ACT relating to the termination of parental rights over 
minors; providing a procedure therefor; defining the jurisdiction of courts in 
relation thereto, and other matters relating thereto.”109 The statute stated that 
“[i]n any [TPR] proceeding the judge may appoint an attorney to act on behalf 
                                                        
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  See id. 
103  See id. 
104  See infra Part II.A–C. 
105  See In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 225–26 (Nev. 2005). 
106  Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989). 
107  See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to 
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the 
forty-fifth state to provide this right). 
108  U.S. CONST. amend. V; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
109  1953 Nev. Stat. 184. 
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of such minor person, or on behalf of the petitioner.”110 It was silent concerning 
counsel for the defendant.111 
The Nevada Supreme Court first considered the TPR defendant’s right to 
counsel in the 1969 Casper v. Huber decision.112 There, a Nevada trial court 
determined that Gerald Casper was an unfit father to his ten-year-old daughter 
Deborah and entered an order terminating his parental rights.113 Casper ap-
pealed and requested an appointed attorney to represent him on the appeal.114 
The Court noted the relevant statute only permitted the appointment of counsel 
to represent the party petitioning for the termination of parental rights or for the 
affected minor.115 Therefore, defendants in TPR proceedings had no statutory 
right to counsel.116 
The Court in Casper declined to consider the father’s due process claim 
under either Article 1, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution or the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because “the appeal [was] clearly frivo-
lous and appointed counsel would not [have been] of any use.”117 The Court 
denied his request for counsel, found that the termination was in the best inter-
ests of the child, and dismissed the appeal as frivolous.118 Casper petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.119 The Court denied his petition.120 
B. Between Lassiter and In re N.D.O 
Only thirteen days after the Lassiter decision, Nevada amended the 1953 
statute.121 It added the requirement that “[i]f the parent or parents of the child 
desire to be represented by counsel, but are indigent, the court may appoint an 
attorney for them.”122 This language has since remained unchanged and is cur-
rently codified as NRS 128.100(2).123 
In 1996, the Nevada Supreme Court decided In re Parental Rights as to 
Weinper, noting that other states have determined “as a matter of due process, 
parents are entitled to: (1) a clear and definite statement of the allegations of the 
petition; (2) notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be heard or defend; 
                                                        
110  Id. at 187. 
111  See id. 
112  Casper v. Huber, 456 P.2d 436, 436–37 (Nev. 1969). 
113  Id. 
114  Id. at 437. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 437–38. 
119  See Casper v. Huber, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970). 
120  Id. 
121  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (decided on June 1, 1981); 1981 
Nev. Stat. 1750 (approved on June 14, 1981). 
122  1981 Nev. Stat. at 1755 (emphasis added). 
123  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100(2) (2013). 
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and (3) the right to counsel.”124 The Court affirmed the trial court’s order ter-
minating parental rights because the defendant had received all of the above 
considerations.125 However, the Court did not state whether the right to counsel 
was a requirement in Nevada.126 
One year later, in In re Parental Rights as to Bow, the Nevada Supreme 
Court again considered the right to counsel in TPR cases.127 There, the defend-
ant appealed the termination of her parental rights on the basis that, although 
she was provided counsel at the final termination hearing, she was denied 
counsel at other critical stages of the proceedings.128 The Court discussed the 
Weinper Court’s observation that other states guaranteed the right to counsel in 
TPR proceedings.129 Curiously, though, the Bow Court implied that the right to 
counsel was a holding of the Weinper Court.130 Nevertheless, the Court af-
firmed the trial court’s termination of parental rights because the defendant was 
provided counsel at the final hearing.131 
In In re Parental Rights as to Daniels, the Court reaffirmed the absolute 
right to counsel in TPR proceedings.132 The issue before the Court concerned 
the right to counsel at an earlier stage of the proceedings, when the children 
were only temporarily removed from the father’s custody.133 The Court deter-
mined that the temporary removal of children does not require the same level of 
procedural safeguards as permanent removal, because the interests at stake are 
not as vital.134 Thus, the Court affirmed the decision to terminate Daniels’s pa-
rental rights.135 
In his dissent, however, Chief Justice Springer noted that once a child is 
temporarily removed from his parents, the probability that the removal will be-
come permanent is greatly increased.136 He noted that even the trial judge was 
troubled by the categorical lack of a due process right to counsel in such cas-
es.137 Justice Springer concluded that “because of the ‘inherent imbalance of 
                                                        
124  In re Parental Rights as to Weinper, 918 P.2d 325, 328 (Nev. 1996) (emphasis added), 
overruled by In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (2000) (overruled on 
an unrelated issue). 
125  Id. at 328, 330. 
126  See id. at 328. 
127  In re Parental Rights as to Bow, 930 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Nev. 1997), overruled by In re 
Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000) (overruled on an unrelated 
issue), and abrogated by In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223 (Nev. 2005). 
128  Id. at 1129, 1134. 
129  Id. at 1134. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
132  In re Parental Rights as to Daniels, 953 P.2d 1, 5 (Nev. 1998), overruled by In re N.J., 8 
P.3d 126 (overruled on an unrelated issue), and abrogated by In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223. 
133  Id. 
134  See id. at 7. 
135  Id. at 10. 
136  Id. at 12 (Springer, C.J., dissenting). 
137  Id. 
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experience and expertise between the parent and the state,’ [he] would adopt a 
per se rule that would provide counsel in all cases in which the state seeks re-
moval of a child from its home.”138 
C. Post In re N.D.O. 
In 2005, the legal landscape regarding the right to counsel in TPR proceed-
ings shifted dramatically. In In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., the Court abro-
gated Weinper, Bow, and Daniels when it held “that no absolute right to coun-
sel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada.”139 It went on to declare, “[o]ur 
statute contemplates a case-by-case determination of whether due process de-
mands the appointment of counsel.”140 In a major setback to Nevada’s Civil 
Gideon movement, the Court retreated from the progress it had made. 
The case involved a proceeding to terminate Letesheia O.’s parental rights 
to her three children, referred to only as N.D.O., T.L.O. and T.O.141 The case 
was originally heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Divi-
sion of Clark County, Nevada.142 The district court assigned counsel to 
Letesheia O., as state precedent required.143 Nevertheless, the court found in 
favor of the state and terminated her parental rights.144 
The court based its decision on Letesheia’s poor record as a parent.145 She 
had been in and out of jail several times for theft convictions.146 The state as-
serted that much of this theft was to support her cocaine habit.147 Additionally, 
the state had previously removed her children on multiple occasions stemming 
from allegations of abuse and neglect.148 Twice, the court mandated a case plan 
in which Letesheia would take classes on substance abuse, domestic violence, 
and parenting and would undergo counseling.149 Both times Letesheia only 
minimally complied with the mandates.150 During this time, the children lived 
primarily with their maternal grandmother.151 In fact, at the time of the TPR 
proceedings, Letesheia had been in jail for nearly twelve out of the previous 
eighteen months.152 
                                                        
138  Id. at 13 (quoting Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Nev. 1979)). 
139  In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 225 (Nev. 2005). 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 223–24. 
142  Id. at 223. 
143  See id. at 226. 
144  Id. at 224, 228. 
145  See id. at 224. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
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Letesheia appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court on the basis that she had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.153 She claimed that her attorney had 
repeatedly failed to object to the admittance of hearsay evidence, that he failed 
to object to evidence regarding her prior felony convictions, and that these er-
rors prejudiced her proceeding.154 
The Court first considered whether Nevada requires the provision of coun-
sel in TPR proceedings.155 It noted, “[r]ecent precedent may have generated 
confusion as to whether, and when, a right to counsel exists.”156 According to 
the Court, the Weinper Court merely observed that other states provided the 
right to counsel in these proceedings, which subsequent opinions mischaracter-
ized as a mandate for the provision of counsel in Nevada TPR proceedings.157 
Returning to the precise language of the Nevada statute, the Court held that “no 
absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada” and that 
the statute required only a case-by-case approach.158 
The Court relied solely on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion and on the relevant federal jurisprudence regarding the Due Process 
Clause.159 The Court did not consider whether the Nevada Constitution’s Due 
Process Clause provided more protection for these indigent defendants.160 
Still, the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge test and determined that 
due process did not require the appointment of counsel for Letesheia.161 The 
Court quickly dispensed with the first and third prongs of the test, finding that 
the parent’s interests in avoiding the “civil death penalty” and the state’s inter-
ests in protecting children from neglect and abuse are both “invariably . . . 
strong in termination proceedings.”162 
The Court then considered the second prong of the Eldridge test—the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the value of additional safe-
guards.163 The record reflected that the trial court admitted a number of hearsay 
statements without objection from Letesheia’s attorney.164 Both the case man-
ager and the investigator for the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) 
testified that the children told them they were happy with their grandmother 
and that the grandmother wanted to keep them.165 Neither the grandmother nor 
                                                        
153  Id. at 225. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. at 225–26. 
156  Id. at 225. 
157  Id.; see supra Part II.B. 
158  In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d at 225. 
159  Id. at 226. 
160  See id. at 225–26. 
161  Id. at 226–27. 
162  Id. at 226. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
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the children testified in court.166 The Court determined that this was harmless 
error, because those same statements were included in the DCFS reports, which 
were already admitted in evidence.167 Thus, with or without effective counsel, 
the statements would have been admitted.168 
It is important to note that this ruling appears to misapply Nevada’s hear-
say rules.169 Thus, a competent attorney may have successfully excluded these 
statements. That the Nevada courts are confused on the application of the hear-
say rules further supports the need for an attorney in all termination of parental 
rights proceedings. 
Finally, the Court found that it was in the best interest of the children to 
terminate Letesheia’s parental rights.170 It partially based its finding on the fact 
that Letesheia failed to present evidence rebutting the presumption that termi-
nation was in the children’s best interest.171 While the record is silent concern-
ing Letesheia’s educational background,172 it seems probable that she was una-
ware of this statutory presumption, of her requirement to rebut that 
presumption, or of how one could rebut the presumption. An effective attorney 
could have assisted her in this regard. 
Ultimately, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It found that 
because she was not entitled to counsel, Letesheia had no viable claim for inef-
fective assistance of counsel.173 Unfortunately, the holding of In re Parental 
Rights as to N.D.O. remains valid law in the state of Nevada. Indigent defend-
ants are no longer entitled to an attorney when the state seeks to terminate their 
parental rights.174 
                                                        
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. at 226–27. 
169  The DCFS reports, themselves, were likely admissible under the Nevada hearsay excep-
tion for public records and reports. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.155 (2013) (“Records, reports, 
statements or data compilations, in any form, of public officials or agencies are not inadmis-
sible under the hearsay rule if they set forth: 1) The activities of the official or agency; 2) 
Matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law; or 3) In civil cases and against the State 
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or the method or circumstances of the in-
vestigation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”). The notes in the report regarding the state-
ments of the children and the grandmother, on the other hand, were likely inadmissible hear-
say. NRS 51.067 plainly states that “[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under 
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms to an exception to the 
hearsay rule provided in this chapter.” Id. § 51.067 (2013). In other words, each level of 
hearsay must fall within an exception to be admissible. 
170  In re N.D.O., 115 P.3d at 227. 
171  Id. at 227 n.19. 
172  See id. at 224–28. 
173  Id. at 227. 
174  Id. at 225. 
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH 
The case-by-case approach, as used by only five states,175 is wrought with 
problems.176 Scholars have consistently noted the method’s flaws,177 yet it per-
sists in Nevada. Unfortunately, data suggests that defendants are suffering as a 
result, especially in Nevada’s appellate process.178 
A. Case-by-Case Approaches, Generally 
1. Justice Blackmun’s Dissent in Lassiter 
The Lassiter decision was not unanimous.179 It was a 5-4 decision, with 
Justices Blackmun, Brennen, Marshall, and Stevens all dissenting.180 Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter is compelling. In it, he argued that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for defendants in every 
TPR proceeding.181 Justice Blackmun noted a strange irony in the majority’s 
reasoning: 
The Court’s analysis is markedly similar to mine; it, too, analyzes the three 
factors listed in Mathews v. Eldridge, and it, too, finds the private interest 
weighty, the procedure devised by the State fraught with risks of error, and the 
countervailing governmental interest insubstantial. Yet, rather than follow this 
balancing process to its logical conclusion, the Court abruptly pulls back and 
announces that a defendant parent must await a case-by-case determination of 
his or her need for counsel. Because the three factors “will not always be so dis-
tributed,” reasons the Court, the Constitution should not be read to “requir[e] the 
appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.”182 
Justice Blackmun went on to state that the Eldridge test called for a case-
by-case consideration of various decision-making contexts, not of various de-
fendants within those contexts.183 He noted that the Court had previously dis-
tinguished welfare recipients as a class of litigants184 and had ruled on Social 
Security pre-termination procedures in general.185 The Lassiter decision ap-
pears to stand in stark opposition to the rationale of the Eldridge court, which 
stated, “To be sure, credibility and veracity may be a factor in the ultimate dis-
                                                        
175  See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to 
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the 
forty-fifth state to provide this right). 
176  See infra Part III.A–B. 
177  See infra Part III.A.2–6. 
178  See infra Part III.B. 
179  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34–35 (1981). 
180  Id. 
181  Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alterations in original). 
182  Id. at 48–49. 
183  Id. at 49. 
184  Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)). 
185  Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–45 (1976)). 
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ability assessment in some cases. But procedural due process rules are shaped 
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the gener-
ality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”186 
Additionally, Justice Blackmun noted the inherent problems in the post hoc 
analysis the majority adopted.187 A case-by-case approach would require a state 
appellate court to review the record in search of evidence that the trial court er-
roneously deprived the defendant of his parental rights.188 While “obvious 
blunders” would be apparent to the reviewing court, the subtle benefits that le-
gal representation could have provided would require “imagination, investiga-
tion, and legal research focused on the particular case.”189 Even with such a 
thorough review, it could still be impossible to discern the effect trained repre-
sentation would have had on the outcome.190 
Finally, Justice Blackmun reasoned that a case-by-case approach would 
have other ancillary drawbacks.191 For instance, the requirement of an ad hoc 
review would increase the strain on the nation’s appellate courts.192 It would 
also carry with it additional monetary costs.193 
Justice Stevens authored a separate dissenting opinion, going one step fur-
ther than Justice Blackmun: 
In my opinion the reasons supporting the conclusion that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the defendant in a criminal case to 
representation by counsel apply with equal force to a case of this kind. The issue 
is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the 
societal benefits. Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not relatively 
insignificant but rather were just as great as the costs of providing prosecutors, 
judges, and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of criminal proceedings, I 
would reach the same result in this category of cases. For the value of protecting 
our liberty from deprivation by the State without due process of law is price-
less.194 
Justice Stevens hinged his dissent on fundamental fairness.195 Considering 
the issue from this perspective—rather than balancing the costs—suggests a 
valuable realization: a parent’s right to her child is fundamental and demands a 
great level of legal protection. 
                                                        
186  Id. at 50 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344). 
187  Id. at 50–51. 
188  See id. 
189  Id. at 51. 
190  Id. 
191  See id. 
192  Id. 
193  Id. 
194  Id. at 59–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
195  See id. 
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2. Procedural Problems with the Case-by-Case Approach 
The case-by-case approach to the appointment of counsel in termination of 
parental rights proceedings presents a number of problems not inherent to a 
categorical approach. First, the case-by-case approach requires trial judges to 
evaluate, in advance, the difference that an attorney might make in the case.196 
This necessarily requires the judge to predict the testimonial, physical, and 
documentary evidence197 and to determine the potential legal complexities and 
other demands the case may lay on the indigent defendant. Because it is impos-
sible for judges to accurately make these predictions, let alone determine the 
potential disputed issues at trial, the defendant suffers the serious risk of being 
denied counsel to which he otherwise may have been entitled.198 
Second, the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing approach is more suited to ap-
plication in an appellate proceeding—not at trial. This approach routinely re-
quires trial judges to evaluate complex and nebulous concepts to determine 
whether due process considerations require the appointment of counsel.199 
Where one judge may interpret “the risk of erroneous deprivation” liberally, 
another may set the bar higher. Thus, the same set of facts may lead one judge 
to appoint counsel and another one to deny counsel. Surely, the use of the 
state’s tremendous power to separate a child permanently from its parents de-
mands a less ambiguous standard than the case-by-case approach provides. 
Finally, appellate review is insufficient, in many cases, to remedy the harm 
caused by the lack of counsel. As Justice Blackman noted in his dissent in Las-
siter: 
Determining the difference legal representation would have made becomes pos-
sible only through imagination, investigation, and legal research focused on the 
particular case. Even if the reviewing court can embark on such an enterprise in 
each case, it might be hard pressed to discern the significance of failures to chal-
lenge the State’s evidence or to develop a satisfactory defense. Such failures, 
however, often cut to the essence of the fairness of the trial, and a court’s inabil-
ity to compensate for them effectively eviscerates the presumption of innocence. 
Because a parent acting pro se is even more likely to be unaware of controlling 
legal standards and practices, and unskilled in garnering relevant facts, it is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the typical case has been adequately 
presented.200 
Furthermore, many indigent defendants never seek appellate review be-
cause they may be unaware of the right to appeal or may believe they have no 
chance of a reversal without the help of counsel.201 Some may even be unaware 
                                                        
196  Pollock & Greco, supra note 25, at 42. 
197  Id. 
198  Id. at 42–43. 
199  See id. at 43. 
200  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
201  Pollock & Greco, supra note 25, at 43. 
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of the option to appeal. In this regard, the denial of counsel also serves to dis-
empower defendants in the appellate process. 
3. Special Considerations of Abuse and Neglect Proceedings 
While abuse and neglect proceedings are not per se termination of parental 
rights proceedings, they share enough similarities to justify their inclusion in 
this discussion. For example, when a Nevada court finds that a parent has 
abused or neglected his child, it has the authority to place the children perma-
nently with a guardian.202 Though this proceeding does not terminate the paren-
tal rights, the permanent removal of the child from the parent creates a similar 
result. 
Moreover, the need for an attorney in abuse and neglect proceedings may 
be even more compelling than in a TPR case. First, evidence obtained in an 
abuse and neglect civil proceeding may later be used against the defendant to 
support criminal charges for the same disputed issues.203 Second, the evidence 
may also be used later to support a petition to permanently terminate the de-
fendant’s parental rights.204  
John Pollock, coordinator for the National Coalition for a Civil Right to 
Counsel, addressed the disturbing issues that arise out of the potential for future 
proceedings based upon abuse and neglect proceedings.205 He noted that par-
ents have the potential to incriminate themselves in these proceedings.206 Evi-
dence obtained in an abuse and neglect proceeding will frequently be used to 
support future TPR proceedings.207 Appointing an attorney at the later TPR 
stage will be of limited use, as much of the fact finding will have been accom-
plished and admitted into the record in the abuse and neglect proceeding.208 As 
the cliché states, it is not possible to “un-ring the bell.” 
4. Private Termination Proceedings 
One could argue that when private parties, rather than the state, initiate 
termination of parental rights proceedings, such proceedings do not justify the 
automatic appointment of counsel for the defendant. The presumed logic be-
hind such a claim is that, because the state is not taking action, the quasi-
criminal aspect of the proceeding is absent. This notion, however, ignores one 
key fact: a successful private TPR petition will still result in the defendant los-
                                                        
202  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.020 (2013) (defining abuse and neglect); id. § 432B.466 
(setting forth the conditions for appointing a guardian). 
203  Pollock, supra note 19, at 780. 
204  Id. 
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208  Id. 
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ing her parental rights.209 Thus, regardless of the party seeking termination, the 
parent’s fundamental rights remain at risk. 
Furthermore, state action is abundant in a TPR proceeding initiated by a 
private party. Often, there is little to no difference in the proceeding when a 
private party initiates it. For example, Nevada law allows “[t]he agency which 
provides child welfare services, the probation officer, or any other person, in-
cluding the mother of an unborn child, . . . [to] file with the clerk of the court a 
petition” for termination of parental rights.210 The statutes do not substantially 
distinguish privately initiated proceedings from publicly initiated proceed-
ings.211 In terms of process and potential outcomes, it is irrelevant who initiates 
the petition.212 
Additionally, some states have attempted to argue that fiscal considerations 
justify denying a right to counsel in private termination proceedings.213 Courts 
that have addressed this issue have routinely held that the state’s interest in sav-
ing money is not as compelling as the parents’ interest in their children.214 Re-
gardless of the reason that defendants are not afforded a categorical right to 
counsel, the case-by-case Eldridge approach becomes the unfortunate alterna-
tive. 
5. Due Process Inadequacies 
Even if one accepts the shaky premise that proper application of the 
Mathews v. Eldridge factors results in the appointment of counsel for all appro-
priate indigent defendants, the due process approach is wrought with pitfalls. 
Professor Rosalie Young notes six barriers to due process in termination of pa-
rental rights proceedings.215 First, the definitions of “indigence” and “financial 
hardship” vary from state to state and from courthouse to courthouse.216 This 
may result in defendants being denied counsel despite the inability to retain an 
attorney on their own. 
                                                        
209  See id. at 784. 
210  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.040 (2013). 
211  See id. §§ 128.005–.190 (listing Nevada’s statutes pertaining to termination of parental 
rights). 
212  See id. § 128.120 (“Any order made and entered by the court under the provisions of 
NRS 128.110 is conclusive and binding upon the person declared to be free from the custody 
and control of his or her parent or parents, and upon all other persons who have been served 
with notice by publication or otherwise, as provided by this chapter.”). 
213  See In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 753 (Ill. 2002) (noting that the state with-
drew its TPR petition so that prospective adoptive parents could begin adoption proceedings, 
where the defendant had no right to counsel and the state would not have the associated ex-
pense). 
214  E.g., id.; In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 1993). 
215  Young, supra note 72, at 263–66. 
216  Id. at 263. 
16 NEV. L.J. 313, FOLEY - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  9:28 PM 
Fall 2015] TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 335 
Second, some states require that parents request an attorney; however, par-
ents are not automatically informed of the right.217 Frequently, these defendants 
are unaware that they may request counsel, or even that they need counsel.218 
This problem compounds after a defendant loses his parental rights at trial. The 
defendant who was ignorant of his right to counsel at the original proceeding is 
likely to be equally uninformed of his right to appeal.219  
Third, trial courts vary in their application of the “clear and convincing ev-
idence” standard.220 An attorney is crucial to ensure that the courts do not slip 
below the standard’s requirements and instead evaluate the case under a “pre-
ponderance of the evidence” standard. 
Fourth, where counsel is appointed but is inadequate, a reversal is rare.221 
Because the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not confer a right to 
counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings, there can be no corre-
sponding appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.222 Even in states 
that allow such appeals, defendants have a monumental hurdle to overcome. To 
succeed, the defendant must show that the attorney was incompetent, that his 
incompetence led to an unfair trial, and that the result was not harmless error.223 
This burden may become insurmountable when the defendant has no attorney 
to argue the appeal. 
Fifth, appointed attorneys are often inadequately compensated.224 Because 
appointment of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings is not a 
constitutional mandate, states may not feel compelled to allocate significant 
funding to the issue. Consequently, many attorneys may choose not to partici-
pate in TPR appointments.225 Moreover, those that do participate may not apply 
their usual degree of zealous representation to the case.226 
Finally, though preliminary proceedings (such as abuse and neglect pro-
ceedings)227 may place crucial facts on the record and may implicate substantial 
rights, counsel may not be appointed until the initiation of a TPR petition.228 By 
that time, however, it may be too late. Hence, the due process approach fails to 
consider the potential implications of lesser proceedings. The categorical provi-
sion of counsel in TPR and all associated proceedings would eliminate this 
problem. 
                                                        
217  Id. at 264. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. 
220  See id. 
221  See id. at 265. 
222  See, e.g., In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 115 P.3d 223, 227 (Nev. 2005). 
223  Young, supra note 72, at 265. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
227  See supra Part III.A.3. 
228  Young, supra note 72 at 265–66. 
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Furthermore, indigent defendants may have a greater need for an attorney 
than non-indigent defendants. Indigent defendants tend to be less educated than 
their non-indigent counterparts.229 In fact, many of the qualities that brought 
them under TPR review militate in favor of counsel. Some may have poor men-
tal functioning or low IQ, be involved in crime, or suffer from drug addic-
tion.230 Nevertheless, termination hearings may require defendants to partici-
pate in discovery, cross-examine witnesses, make objections, preserve issues 
for appeal, and determine and prove the relevant facts.231 These tasks are diffi-
cult for even a well-educated layperson. It is a daunting endeavor for the uned-
ucated defendant, especially one with the aforementioned problems. 
6. The Consequences of Pro Se Representation 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s finding that the presence of an attor-
ney would not have affected Ms. Lassiter’s case,232 research suggests that ade-
quate representation has a significant effect on trial outcomes.233 Because pro se 
defendants often lack knowledge of legal processes, they frequently lose due to 
a procedural error or default.234 Additionally, pro se defendants are unskilled in 
the practice of discovery and trial motions, which, when accomplished by 
skilled attorneys, often makes the difference between winning and losing a 
case.235 
In fact, studies show a significant difference in the success rates of pro se 
defendants and represented defendants. For example, at contested proceedings 
in general, a party’s odds of success are cut in half when she has no attorney.236 
Even in relatively simple protective order proceedings, the numbers are strik-
                                                        
229  See Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, 
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 398 (2004) (noting a 
link between poverty and a lack of education of inmate populations). 
230  See Richard C. Boldt, Evaluating Histories of Substance Abuse in Cases Involving the 
Termination of Parental Rights, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 135, 135 (1999) (discussing 
“the intersecting problems of parental substance abuse and child neglect and abuse” in TPR 
cases); Alexis C. Collentine, Note, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A Call for 
Change in State Termination of Parental Rights Statutes, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535, 542 
(2005) (explaining that “parents with mental disabilities are more likely than the rest of the 
parental population to have their children removed and their parental rights terminated” 
(footnote omitted)). 
231  Young, supra note 72, at 257–58. 
232  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32–33 (1981). 
233  See Alba, supra note 21, at 1095–98. 
234  Id. at 1096–97. 
235  Id. at 1097. 
236  Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right to 
Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 72 (2007) (citing Robert H. Mnookin et al., 
Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in 
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 64 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herman Hill Kay 
eds., 1990)). 
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ing: the petitioning party with an attorney is successful 83 percent of the 
time.237 The pro se party wins only 32 percent of the same petitions. 
Attorneys and judges frequently remark as to the disparity between repre-
sented and pro se defendants: 
Lawyers acknowledge this problem and have released numerous resolu-
tions, studies, and scholarly articles arguing the issue. Though their statements 
could arguably be colored by professional self interest, judges who preside over 
civil proceedings also acknowledge this reality. A judge who served on the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals observed that the countless cases he reviewed where a 
pro se party argued against a lawyer left him with serious doubts as to whether 
pro se litigants obtain fair hearings. This is true even despite the fact that courts 
hold pro se filings to less stringent standards than attorney filings. Many of these 
pro se litigants need the assistance of an attorney in order to obtain the fair hear-
ing that is their constitutional right, but our current system leaves them to fend 
for themselves.238 
As the Gideon Court astutely observed, “That government hires lawyers to 
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the 
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts 
are necessities, not luxuries.”239 
B. Analysis of the Current Nevada Statute and Its Applications 
Section 128.100, the Nevada statute regarding the appointment of counsel 
for TPR proceedings, reads as follows: 
1. In any proceeding for terminating parental rights, or any rehearing or ap-
peal thereon, or any proceeding for restoring parental rights, the court may ap-
point an attorney to represent the child as his or her counsel and, if the child 
does not have a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to NRS 432B.500, as his 
or her guardian ad litem. The child may be represented by an attorney at all 
stages of any proceedings for terminating parental rights. If the child is repre-
sented by an attorney, the attorney has the same authority and rights as an attor-
ney representing a party to the proceedings. 
2. If the parent or parents of the child desire to be represented by counsel, 
but are indigent, the court may appoint an attorney for them. 
3. Each attorney appointed under the provisions of this section is entitled to 
the same compensation and expenses from the county as provided in NRS 7.125 
and 7.135 for attorneys appointed to represent persons charged with crimes.240 
1.  Nevada Trial Statistics 
NRS section 128.100 grants Nevada courts discretionary authority to ap-
point counsel. It is difficult to determine accurately how courts across the state 
                                                        
237  Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges 
to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 511–12 (2003). 
238  Alba, supra note 21, at 1097–98 (footnotes omitted). 
239  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
240  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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are exercising this discretion. In Clark County, however, the number of TPR 
cases is on the rise.241 The Clark County Family Court averages about 300 open 
cases at any given time.242 As of June 25, 2015, private attorneys (who are con-
tracted for conflict cases from the Special Public Defender’s Office) had 313 
open TPR cases.243 Nearly all of these TPR defendants are indigent.244 
Family Court Judge Frank Sullivan notes that the recent increase in TPR 
cases corresponds to an increase in the percentage of contested cases, a phe-
nomenon he believes stems from a recent policy change.245 In 2010, Judge Sul-
livan instituted a policy requiring the Family Court to appoint counsel for TPR 
defendants.246 While this development is very encouraging, it says nothing 
about the status of TPR defendants outside of Clark County, nor does it guaran-
tee the policy will remain after Judge Sullivan leaves the bench.  
In Clark County, judges ask defendants about their financial status during 
their initial hearing.247 It appears that nearly every request for counsel is grant-
ed in TPR proceedings;248 however, the number is less for abuse and neglect 
proceedings.249 If the judge appoints counsel, the Special Public Defender’s of-
fice assigns an attorney to the case. When there is a conflict of interest in the 
Special Public Defender’s office, a private, contracted attorney is appointed.250  
2.  Nevada Appellate Statistics 
Nevada’s appellate numbers tell a more discouraging tale. From 2012 to 
2014, sixty-four TPR defendants filed appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court 
after losing their parental rights at trial.251 Of the twenty-three filed in 2012, fif-
teen appellants had the assistance of counsel and eight were pro se.252 The mat-
                                                        
241  Yesenia Amaro, Judges Face Rising Tide of Parental Rights Termination Cases, L.V. 
REV.-J. (May 10, 2015, 1:38 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/judges-
face-rising-tide-parental-rights-termination-cases. 
242  Id. 
243  Telephone Interview with Drew Christensen, Dir., Clark Cty. Office of Appointed Coun-
sel (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter Christensen Interview]. 
244  Memorandum from Courtney Ketter, Law Clerk to the Honorable Frank P. Sullivan, to 
author (Feb. 26, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ketter Memorandum] (“I can only 
recall one case in the past year where a parent was able to afford private counsel on his 
own.”). 
245  Amaro, supra note 241. 
246  Id. 
247  Ketter Memorandum, supra note 244. 
248  Id. (stating that “99 [percent] of the request[s] are granted”); see also Christensen Inter-
view, supra note 243 (stating that nearly 100 percent of TPR defendants receive appointed 
counsel at the trial level). 
249  Christensen Interview, supra note 243. The lack of counsel in abuse and neglect proceed-
ings can prejudice the defendants in later TPR proceedings. See supra Part III.A.3. 
250  Christensen Interview, supra note 243. 
251  E-mail from Susan Wilson, Supervisory Staff Attorney, Nev. Supreme Court, to Justice 
Kristina Pickering, Nev. Supreme Court (Mar. 26, 2015) (on file with author). 
252  Id. 
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ters of the fifteen represented appellants proceeded without complications.253 
However, of the eight pro se appellants, only five successfully navigated the 
process.254 The other three had their appeals dismissed for various procedural 
problems.255 The numbers from 2013 are even more disturbing. Ten of the 
twenty-two appeals included pro se appellants.256 Of those ten, the Court dis-
missed eight appeals on procedural grounds without hearing the appeal’s mer-
it.257 None of the represented parents failed on procedural grounds.258 Again, in 
2014, the Court dismissed five of nine pro se TPR appeals on procedural 
grounds.259 As before, all of the represented appellants successfully navigated 
the appellate process.260 
The contrast between represented parents and unrepresented parents is 
striking. From 2012 to 2014, no represented parent’s appeal was dismissed pri-
or to reaching a decision on the merits.261 Over the same period, the Court dis-
missed 59 percent of pro se filings for jurisdictional problems or for failure to 
prosecute.262 This disparity suggests that the presence of counsel has a measur-
able effect on the outcome of TPR appeals and the absence of counsel is often 
dispositive. 
The availability of an attorney for appeal often depends on what form of at-
torney represents the parents at trial: an attorney with the Special Public De-
fender’s office or a private attorney appointed due to a conflict of interest with 
the SPD office. Private attorneys frequently do not handle appeals and therefore 
withdraw after the TPR trial.263 While attorneys for the Special Public Defend-
er’s office will handle the appeal for parents that the attorneys represented at 
trial, the office does not take on appeals for parents who had a private attorney 
at trial.264 In 2013 alone, 740 defendants received private representation in their 
TPR proceeding.265 Therefore, defendants often lack an attorney on appeal. 
                                                        
253  See id. 
254  Id. 
255  Id. (explaining that the appeals were dismissed for jurisdictional problems or for failure 
to prosecute). 
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  See id. 
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261  See id. 
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IV. JUSTIFYING REFORM 
Nevada must join the other forty-five states266 that provide a categorical 
right to counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings. This can be ac-
complished in one of two ways. First, the Nevada Supreme Court should inter-
pret the Nevada Constitution’s Due Process Clause more liberally than the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, and require the ap-
pointment of counsel for TPR defendants. This, presumably, would not require 
the Court to overrule In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., as that decision was 
based upon the Lassiter Court’s review of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause.267 
Second, the Nevada legislature should amend NRS section 128.100(2) to 
state, “If the parent or parents of the child desire to be represented by counsel, 
but are indigent, the court shall appoint an attorney for them.” The discretion-
ary word “may” should be replaced with the compulsory word “shall.” Either 
one of these options would circumvent the numerous pitfalls of the case-by-
case approach currently in use in Nevada268 and would much more ably protect 
the rights of the state’s indigent defendants.269 
Furthermore, Nevada courts must inform defendants of the newly created 
right to counsel, of their right to appeal should they lose, and their right to an 
attorney on that appeal. A TPR defendant should proceed pro se only with an 
informed waiver of his right to counsel. 
The Civil Gideon movement has widespread support in the legal communi-
ty, as the American Bar Association demonstrated in 2006 when its House of 
Delegates unanimously endorsed a resolution supporting Civil Gideon. 
[T]he American Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial governments 
to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income 
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs 
are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child 
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.270 
A. Using a Mathews v. Eldridge Analysis to Support Reform 
The Lassiter Court hinged its decision upon the fact that “an indigent’s 
right to appointed counsel . . . has been recognized to exist only where the liti-
gant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.”271 That the Su-
                                                        
266  See Pollock, supra note 19 (noting that forty-four states provided a categorical right to 
counsel in 2013); see also In re T.M., 319 P.3d 338, 355 (Haw. 2014) (making Hawaii the 
forty-fifth state to provide this right). 
267  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981). 
268  See generally supra Part III. 
269  Though the determination of indigence will remain subjective, removing the other varia-
bles created by the case-by-case approach will help to substantially reduce the unpredictabil-
ity and subjectivity experienced by TPR defendants. 
270  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 97, at 1. 
271  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. 
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preme Court regards even minor deprivations of physical liberty to be more se-
rious than the permanent loss of one’s child is troubling. 
A proper Mathews v. Eldridge analysis demonstrates that TPR defendants 
are entitled to the right to counsel. The first factor in the test is a consideration 
of the private interests at stake in the proceeding.272 In Lassiter, the Supreme 
Court noted that its “decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for 
multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, 
custody and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that 
‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection.’ ”273 
The Nevada Supreme Court also acknowledged the compelling private in-
terests when it stated, “termination of a parent’s rights to her child is tanta-
mount to imposition of a civil death penalty.”274 This may, in fact, be an under-
statement, as many parents value their own life less than they value the life of 
their child. Consider for example, a mother faced with the horrible choice be-
tween saving her unborn baby’s life and saving her own life. Some in this situa-
tion choose to save the baby275—and this is a child she has not even met. Thus, 
there can be little doubt that the private interest at stake in a TPR proceeding is 
at least as compelling as that in a minor criminal proceeding. 
The second Eldridge factor regards the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
and the value of additional procedural safeguards.276 The Supreme Court noted 
that “numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding” 
in TPR proceedings.277 The Court observed that these proceedings employed 
nebulous substantive standards that subjected the review to the judge’s own 
subjective values.278 Indigent defendants, largely comprised of minorities and 
uneducated persons, are “vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bi-
as.”279 
In addition to the many other factors discussed above,280 these additional 
risks demonstrate the vital need for an attorney.281 The presence of counsel can 
mitigate these problems.282 A trained voice can help ensure that the judge’s bi-
ases do not affect his discretion.283 The benefit of representation in a TPR pro-
ceeding is likely significant. Defendants may need to write motions, ask for 
                                                        
272  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
273  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
274  Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989). 
275  See, e.g., Mom Chooses to Die During Childbirth to Save Son, ABC7.COM (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://abc7.com/family/mom-chooses-to-die-during-childbirth-to-save-son/408747. 
276  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. 
277  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982). 
278  Id. 
279  Id. at 763. 
280  See supra Part III.A.2–6. 
281  See Alba, supra note 21, at 1108. 
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discovery, unearth relevant facts, and argue complex issues. Trained attorneys 
are far more capable of accomplishing these vital steps.  
Finally, the third Eldridge factor regards the government’s interest in the 
proceeding, including the costs of providing additional safeguards.284 The gov-
ernment has two key interests in TPR proceedings.285 The first is its parens pa-
triae interest in the welfare of the child.286 The second is its interest in reducing 
the cost of the relevant proceedings.287 The parens patriae interest is similar to 
the interests of the parents. If anything, this interest favors keeping a child with 
her parents.288 Additionally, a court is better equipped to provide for the welfare 
of the child when counsel is present to raise appropriate issues and bring rele-
vant facts to the court’s attention.289 
Regarding the government’s financial interests, Attorney Sarah Dina 
Moore Alba argues that providing a categorical right to counsel can actually 
save the government money.290 Alba cites several studies demonstrating that 
civil cases with attorneys are more cost effective than those that proceed with 
pro se parties.291 She also notes that the use of attorneys results in fewer chil-
dren being separated from their parents, which saves the government the ex-
pense of providing foster homes.292 Even if the government were to incur more 
costs from the appointment of counsel, this interest cannot outweigh the par-
ent’s interest. As even the Lassiter majority conceded, “[T]hough the State’s 
pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome pri-
vate interests as important as those here . . . .”293 
When one considers these three factors together, the balance tips consider-
ably towards the categorical provision of counsel in termination of parental 
rights proceedings. The Lassiter majority may have erred in its consideration of 
the first two factors. First, it appears to have undervalued the interest of the 
parent in keeping their children. Second, it failed to recognize the benefit of 
counsel in even simple proceedings. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances 
in which the interest of the parent would be greater. An attorney is essential to 
protect this interest. Thus, the Eldridge factors demand the appointment of 
counsel in all TPR proceedings. 
                                                        
284  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
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CONCLUSION 
Termination of parental rights proceedings are a “civil death penalty.”294 
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have all recognized the short-
comings of the case-by-case approach. Nevada is one of only five states that 
directs the substantial mechanism of governmental power to remove a child 
permanently from her parents while denying those subject to that deprivation 
the right to an attorney. This must be corrected either by statutory reform or by 
judicial recognition of more substantial Nevada due process rights. Society 
should be confident that the system employs all possible measures to ensure the 
process is fair. It is past time for Civil Gideon to come to Nevada. Parents may 
not always deserve their children, but they always deserve adequate representa-
tion to ensure a fair adjudication of the matter. The recognition of individual 
due process rights demands nothing less. 
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